Static and Dynamic Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the Vaccine Industry
研究旨在提高现有疫苗使用率的公共政策如何影响新疫苗研发，发现政策使新疫苗临床试验增加2.5倍，但部分创新社会浪费，而某些情况下动态福利收益超过静态收益。
Public policies designed to increase utilization of existing technologies may also affect incentives to develop new technologies. This paper investigates this phenomenon by examining policies designed to increase usage of preexisting vaccines. I find that these policies were associated with a 2.5-fold increase in clinical trials for new vaccines. For several diseases, the induced innovation is socially wasteful, though small in magnitude. In one case, however, the "dynamic" social welfare benefits from induced innovation exceed the policies' "static" benefits from increasing vaccination with existing technology. These findings underscore the importance of including technological progress in economic analysis of public policy.