Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies
利用新的大股东-公司面板数据，发现公司投资、财务、运营和高管薪酬政策因大股东类型而异，且大股东异质性对公司政策和业绩有重要影响。
Employing a new blockholder-firm panel data set in which we can track large shareholders across firms and over time, we find that firms ’ investment, financial, operational, and executive compensation policies vary with the particular blockholder present in a firm. The effects are strongest for activists, pension funds, and corporations, and weakest for banks, trusts, and money managers. We also find that large-shareholder fixed effects in corporate policies vary systematically with blockholder fixed effects in performance. Finally, we show that activists, pension funds, corporations, and private equity firms are more likely to influence firm policies, while mutual funds select firms based on their policies. The contribution of our paper is to show that heterogeneity in beliefs, skills, or risk preferences across large shareholders plays an important role for firms ’ policies and performance.