Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
构建了一个包含逆向选择和信号传递的竞争性池化模型，池子通过贡献数量限制来区分，家庭通过选择池子传递可靠性信号。该模型将罗斯柴尔德-斯蒂格利茨保险模型作为特例，并证明其分离均衡总是存在且唯一。
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household's deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by recasting their hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story in our perfectly competitive framework, their separating equilibrium always exists (even when they say it does not) and is unique.