A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents
构建了一个动态代理模型，研究管理层在资本市场约束下如何通过平滑派息来最大化自身租金，发现总派息遵循林特纳目标调整模型，且平滑行为通过借贷实现，风险厌恶导致投资不足但习惯形成可缓解。
ABSTRACT We develop a dynamic agency model in which payout, investment, and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintner's (1956) target adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment.