Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution
研究了为少数群体设定专属选区（仅允许少数群体候选人竞选）的强制政治代表权政策如何影响再分配。模型预测，当少数群体经济弱势且选民存在内群体偏袒时，该政策可能减少对较贫困群体的转移支付，并加剧少数群体内部的不平等。
Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority‐group candidates are permitted to contest. This paper builds a political‐economy model to analyse the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. The model predicts that in situations where the minority is economically disadvantaged and where voters exhibit an in‐group bias, such a quota can reduce transfers to poorer groups. This suggests that the gains to the minority group from having such quotas are unevenly distributed. Redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within‐group inequality for the minorities.