Competitive pricing strategies in social networks
研究竞争企业向消费者销售异质产品时的定价策略，发现企业会根据网络位置进行价格歧视，对更中心的消费者收取更低价格，并分析了网络密度和网络效应的影响。
Abstract We study pricing strategies of competing firms selling heterogeneous products to consumers. Goods are substitutes and there are network externalities between neighboring consumers. In equilibrium, firms price discriminate based on the network positions and charge lower prices to more central consumers. We also show that, under some conditions, firms' equilibrium profits decrease when either the network becomes denser or network effects increase. In contrast, consumers always benefit from being more connected to each other. We determine the optimal network structure and compare uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing from the perspectives of firms and consumers.