企业的分解:选择性干预、高能激励与分子单元

The Disaggregation of Corporations: Selective Intervention, High-Powered Incentives, and Molecular Units

ORGANIZATION SCIENCE · 1997
被引 457
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

分析了美国企业通过缩小规模、聚焦核心业务和垂直分解等组织变革,将内部单位视为外部承包商,形成由小型自主单元构成的网络,并解释了这种分解由小规模带来的强绩效激励驱动,信息技术和组织创新则促进了选择性干预。

Abstract

A vast array of organizational innovations and changes are transforming US corporations. Large firms have dramatically downsized, refocused, and vertically disaggregated. They increasingly obtain goods and services, pursue complex development efforts, and exploit horizontal synergies without the aid of formal hierarchy. Large firms are also internally disaggregating into smaller, more autonomous units that are treated much like external subcontractors. The authors argue that these organizational innovations share an important underlying commonalty: economic activity is converging toward exchange involving either internal (within-firm) or external (between-firm) networks of small, autonomous production or service units. Small units and small firms have become the basic building block, the molecular units, of these new forms. Further, exchange among the small, autonomous units is commonly a mix of both market-like and hierarchical features. The authors develop a theoretical explanation for these trends. They argue that disaggregation is motivated by the powerful performance incentives that accompany small size. They further argue that disaggregation is facilitated by recent innovations in information technology, organizational design, and performance measurement that permit the selective intervention of market elements in hierarchy and hierarchical elements in markets. The enhanced ability to intervene selectively necessitates a rethinking of traditional assumptions about the discreteness of governance choices. Innovations in organization, measurement, and technology shift decisions about optimal governance from simple market versus hierarchy choices to choices of an optimal mix of hierarchical and market elements. Consequently, managers and scholars must increasingly view organizations as complex webs of governance arrangements rather than as entities with definable boundaries.

公司治理组织经济学产业组织企业战略