Resistance to the Regulation of Common Water Resources in Rural Tunisia
通过突尼斯农村农业用水户的选择实验，研究发现统一水费征收虽能提高效率并惠及小农户，但遭到大地主的强烈抵制，表明资源异质性影响监管的分配效应。
We examine the effect of the introduction of uniform water charging for aquifer management and provide evidence using a survey-based choice experiment of agricultural water users in rural Tunisia. Theoretically, we show that the implementation of the proposed second-best regulation would result both in efficiency gains and in distributional effects in favor of small landholders. Empirically, we find that resistance to the introduction of an effective water-charging regime is greatest among the largest landholders. Resistance to the regulation of common resources may be rooted in the manner in which heterogeneity might determine the distributional impact of different management regimes. <i></i>