Relationships and Growth: On the Dynamic Interplay between Relational Contracts and Competitive Markets in Economic Development
构建动态一般均衡模型，研究正式合同与关系合同在经济发展中的内生演化及其与市场均衡的共变关系，发现关系合同在增长阶段促进市场形成，但在成熟阶段作用减弱。
This article presents a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how different contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements emerge endogenously and are linked dynamically with the process of economic development. Formal contracts are enforced by third-party institutions (courts), whereas relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without third-party involvement. The novel feature of our model is that it demonstrates the co-evolution of these different enforcement modes and market equilibrium conditions, all of which are jointly determined. We then characterize the equilibrium paths of such dynamic processes and show the time structure of relational contracting in the process of development. In particular, we show that relational contracting fosters the emergence of a market-based economy in the growth phase of development; however, its role declines as the economy enters a mature phase.