The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China
研究中国公司诉讼公告对股价的影响，发现被告和原告公司股价均下跌，但政治关联的被告在司法过程中受到优待，更可能上诉并获胜，国有控股被告在上诉中表现更好。
We examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process.