Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity, Monitoring Complexity, and CEO Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity
基于信息处理理论，研究董事会信息处理能力如何影响CEO薪酬与绩效的挂钩程度，发现大董事会和监督环境简单的董事会更少使用股权激励，对大型制造企业有参考价值。
We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board-chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome-based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large-, medium-, and small-cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock-based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome-based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.