Dynamic information disclosure
研究发送者如何动态披露信息以说服部分知情的接收者采取行动，发现垂直信息下最优披露是静态的，而水平信息下顺序披露更有利，且时间间隔趋零时几乎瞬间完全披露。
We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits from sequential disclosure. Assuming partial commitment and a special receiver‐type space, a Markov equilibrium exists and almost instant full disclosure arises in the limit.