Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions
建立了一个主权债务模型，指出政府违约会破坏国内银行的资产负债表，从而造成成本。模型预测违约会导致私人信贷下降，且在金融体系更发达、银行持有更多政府债券的国家，这种下降更显著，但违约本身更少发生。
ABSTRACT We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.