Proximity to the SEC and Stock Price Crash Risk
研究发现，离美国证券交易委员会越远的公司，股价崩盘风险越高，且财务报表可读性差或SEC预算较小时这一效应更明显，表明SEC监管能改善披露行为、降低负面消息集中爆发的概率。
We explore the possibility that Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight influences disclosure practices in a manner that reduces the likelihood of individual stock price crashes. Firms located farther from the SEC have greater stock price crash risk and this result is more pronounced for firms with financial statements that are less readable (those with larger 10‐K filings) and more pronounced when SEC budgets are relatively smaller. Similar results are obtained in response to SEC regional office location changes that are more likely to be exogenous. Our results suggest that SEC oversight induces disclosure practices that reduce the likelihood of large negative disclosures.