Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining
构建了一个工人通过简单多数投票决定工资和就业的工会行为模型，发现工会的多数偏好通常无法用冯·诺依曼-摩根斯坦效用函数表示，因此不能直接套用传统谈判模型，并提出了与之兼容的新谈判模型及比较静态分析结果。
We consider a model oflabor union behavior in which workers make decisions about wages and employment by simple majority rule. We show that under general conditions such a union has a well-behaved objective function, different from those previously postulated in the literature. We then show that the union's majority preferences generally lack a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation and thus cannot be inserted into traditional bargaining models. We then develop and characterize the solutions to a new bargaining model that is consistent with the structure of union preferences. Several comparative-statics results are presented.