Multiple Taxpayers and Litigation Cost Reimbursement Rules
研究了多个类似案件的纳税人存在时，美国国税局（IRS）的诉讼与和解决策变化，发现两个纳税人即可促使IRS更倾向审判而非和解，且有利于纳税人的费用补偿规则反而可能增加审判。
This study examines whether the existence of multiple taxpayers who have similar cases will affect the settlement/litigation decisions of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It also investigates whether changes in tax laws that reduce taxpayers' litigation cost burden will encourage the IRS to settle more tax cases. I find that the existence of just two taxpayers can make the IRS prefer a trial to a settlement even when the IRS would settle if there were a single taxpayer. I also find that changes in litigation cost reimbursement rules favoring taxpayers will not lead to more settlements as expected. Instead, such changes can result in more trials. Litigation cost reimbursement rules decrease taxpayers' total burden in general, but could increase that of those who have strong cases in some settings.