Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games
研究了在不完全公共监督的重复博弈中，声誉效应如何影响长期参与者的均衡收益，发现当博弈周期缩短时，完全信息下的均衡收益收敛于静态均衡，而引入承诺类型的小概率扰动后，声誉效应在高频极限下依然显著。
Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long‐run player interacts frequently with a population of short‐run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through the flow of information , a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the long‐run player converges, as the period length tends to zero, to the set of static equilibrium payoffs, whereas when the game is perturbed by a small ex ante probability on commitment types, reputation effects remain powerful in the high‐frequency limit.