Multitier Store Brands and Channel Profits
从理论上研究了零售商为何引入多层自有品牌、其最优质量水平如何，以及对消费者福利和渠道利润的影响。研究发现，即使制造商通过支付或引入全国品牌来阻止，零售商仍会提供多层自有品牌，且自有品牌与全国品牌的质量水平交错，但自有品牌增加并不降低消费者福利或渠道利润。
Multitier store brands are increasing in significance in retail outlets. In this article, the authors theoretically examine the rationale for the existence of multitier store brands, their optimal quality levels, and their implications for consumer welfare and channel profits. They show that despite the manufacturer's efforts to deter the entry of store brands by providing side payments and/or introducing additional national brands, the retailer will offer multitier store brands in equilibrium. Furthermore, the quality levels of store brands and national brands are interlaced, with a store brand taking the top-quality position unless national brands outnumber store brands. Even though the proliferation of store brands reduces product differentiation, it does not decrease consumer welfare or channel profits. However, store brands hurt the manufacturer's profits and make two-part tariffs ineffective in improving channel coordination. Nonetheless, the retailer can enhance channel coordination by procuring the store brand from the national brand manufacturer. The authors extend their model in several directions to capture additional features of retail markets and assess the robustness of their findings.