Centralized Deployment and Teacher Incentives: Evidence from Reforms in Rural China
研究了中国农村教师部署集中化改革对教师努力程度和学生考试成绩的负面影响，发现集中化破坏了地方绩效工资的实施。
This article evaluates teacher deployment centralization reform in the context of rural China. The administration of regular teacher deployment has been gradually moved from the township (or local school district) up to the county government since 2001. We exploit variations in the timing of deployment centralization and use as a comparison group contract teachers who were not directly affected. Data collected from Gansu Province in 2000 and 2004 show that deployment centralization negatively affected teacher effort and student test scores. Changes in wage structure suggest a likely channel: the implementation of localized performance pay was disrupted by the centralization of teacher deployment.