Information acquisition, referral, and organization
研究了两位专家在未知状态下为客户提供服务时，通过推荐和费用分享机制产生的效率问题，发现市场均衡无效率，而组织内推荐虽能恢复效率却导致被推荐专家偷懒。
Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.