Does Exclusive Dealing Matter? Evidence from Distribution Contract Changes in The U.S. Beer Industry
研究限制啤酒经销商外部交易机会是否增加其经销品牌的市场份额，利用百威英博分销协议变化和加州杂货店数据，发现排他性经销使英博市场份额提升6%，零售价无显著变化。
We examine whether restricting a beer distributor's external trading opportunities increases the market shares of brands carried by the distributor. We use distribution status changes from the Anheuser‐Busch‐InBev distribution agreement, along with a panel scanner data set from a grocery chain in California, to implement a ‘difference‐in‐differences’ empirical strategy. We find that InBev's market share increased by 6% once InBev was carried by Anheuser‐Busch's exclusive distributors, while InBev's retail price had no significant change. The effect on InBev's market share is stronger for smaller stores that carry more brands. These results are consistent with the efficiency‐based theory of exclusive dealing.