Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
提出一种认知方法，通过谈判中的要约解读来定义不完全信息下的稳定匹配，并证明其与Liu等人提出的不完全信息稳定性等价。
A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This paper proposes an epistemic approach. Agents negotiate through offers, and offers are interpreted according to the highest possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed “stable” if maintaining the current allocation is a rationalizable action for each agent. The main result shows an equivalence between this notion and “incomplete‐information stability,” a cooperative solution concept put forward by Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014) for markets with incomplete information.