Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human Capital: Theory and Evidence
研究了横向调动与晋升之间的关系，通过理论模型和1981-1985年美国大型企业高管数据，发现横向调动后员工更可能晋升且工资增长更大，高学历者横向调动概率更低。
Abstract This paper studies the link between lateral mobility and promotions. The first part of the paper extends the theoretical literature by incorporating lateral moves into a job assignment model with task-specific human capital accumulation. The model thus predicts that workers who are laterally moved in one period are more likely to be subsequently promoted and experience larger wage growth compared with workers who are not laterally moved. In addition, workers with very high levels of education are less likely to be laterally moved compared with workers with lower levels of education. We test the model’s predictions using a large employer–employee linked panel dataset on senior managers in a sample of large US firms during the period 1981 to 1985. Our findings support the theoretical predictions and show the importance of lateral mobility in wage and promotion dynamics.