Career concerns with exponential learning
研究了能力与努力互补时，职业关切如何影响市场结构下的努力和工资路径，发现均衡努力和工资随资历先升后降，且代理人努力不足、过晚，而竞争企业的工资承诺可缓解低效。
This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times are strategic substitutes and, as a result, the unique equilibrium effort and wage paths are single-peaked with seniority. Moreover, for any wage profile, the agent works too little, too late. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.