向下名义工资刚性、货币盯住与非自愿失业

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity, Currency Pegs, and Involuntary Unemployment

Journal of Political Economy · 2016
被引 510
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了固定汇率、名义工资刚性和资本自由流动组合导致的低效率,发现货币盯住和资本自由流动产生负外部性,导致繁荣期过度借贷和衰退期高失业,最优资本管制可降低失业约5个百分点。

Abstract

This paper analyzes the inefficiencies arising from the combination of fixed exchange rates, nominal rigidity, and free capital mobility. We document that nominal wages are downwardly rigid in emerging countries. We develop an open-economy model that incorporates this friction. The model predicts that the combination of a currency peg and free capital mobility creates a negative externality that causes overborrowing during booms and high unemployment during contractions. Optimal capital controls are shown to be prudential. For plausible calibrations, they reduce unemployment by around 5 percentage points. The optimal exchange rate policy eliminates unemployment and calls for large devaluations during crises.

名义工资刚性固定汇率制资本管制最优汇率政策