Incentive Contracts and the Allocation of Talent
构建了一个人才配置理论，将能力、薪酬绩效敏感性和薪酬水平联系起来，分析企业如何通过激励合同筛选和激励不同能力的管理者，并预测技术进步和产品竞争对工资分布、薪酬结构和就业的影响。
This article develops a theory of sorting that links ability, pay‐performance sensitivity and pay levels. Firms employ managers to improve productivity. Because of limited liability, firms use incentive contracts to elicit managerial effort; the type of optimal contract depends on a manager's ability. In equilibrium, individuals are sorted based on ability into production workers, business owners, managers paid an ability‐invariant bonus, and managers whose pay varies with ability and firm size. The model generates predictions regarding the effects of technological progress and product competition on the distributions of wages, pay structure and employment across a wide range of managerial levels.