Structural Estimation of a Becker-Ehrlich Equilibrium Model of Crime: Allocating Police Across Cities to Reduce Crime
构建了一个博弈模型，将警察数量、犯罪率、逮捕率、就业率和工资率作为均衡结果，利用美国都市区数据估计模型，并评估联邦转移支付增加警察对犯罪的影响，发现考虑城市异质性对优化警察配置至关重要。
We develop a model of crime in which the number of police, the crime rate, the arrest rate, the employment rate, and the wage rate are joint outcomes of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The local government chooses the size of its police force and citizens choose among work, home, and crime alternatives. We estimate the model using metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level data. We use the estimated model to examine the effects on crime of targeted federal transfers to local governments to increase police. We find that knowledge about unobserved MSA-specific attributes is critical for the optimal allocation of police across MSA’s.