Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines
研究声誉如何解释谈判中的截止日期效应，即截止日期前交易频繁发生。理性代理人模仿固执行为类型的要求，在截止日期不确定时进行边缘政策。
I highlight how reputational concerns provide a natural explanation for “deadline effects,” the high frequency of deals prior to a deadline in bargaining. Rational agents imitate the demands of obstinate behavioral types and engage in brinkmanship in the face of uncertainty about the deadline's arrival. I also identify how surplus is divided when the prior probability of behavioral types is vanishingly small. If behavioral types are committed to fixed demands, outcomes converge to the Nash bargaining solution regardless of agents' respective impatience. If behavioral types can adopt more complex demand strategies, outcomes converge to the solution of an alternating offers game without behavioral types for the deadline environment.