Consumer obfuscation by a multiproduct firm
研究多产品企业如何利用搜索成本诱导消费者按特定顺序搜索其产品，从而通过提高早期搜索产品的价格来获利，最优混淆策略使消费者仅在之前匹配值极差时才检查后续产品。
Abstract This article shows that a multiproduct firm has incentives to obfuscate its products by using search costs to induce consumers to search through its products in a particular order. The consumers who draw high valuations of the first product terminate their search earlier than the consumers who draw low valuations. Thus, the firm has incentives to raise the price of the earlier searched product. The optimal search cost for an obfuscated product is such that consumers inspect the product only if the match values of the previously searched goods have been very poor.