Power Dynamics in Organizations
研究一个拥有正式项目决策权的委托人与掌握私人信息的代理人之间的无限重复博弈，揭示权力如何被赢得、失去和保留，解释为何类似企业组织方式不同且绩效差异持续存在。
We examine an infinitely repeated game between a principal, who has the formal authority to decide on a project, and a biased agent, who is privately informed about what projects are available. The optimal relational contract speaks to how power is earned, lost, and retained. It shows that entrenched power structures are consistent with optimal administration of power. And it provides new perspectives on why similar firms organize differently, even when those organizational differences lead to persistent differences in performance, and why established firms fail to exploit new opportunities, even when they are publicly observable.