On the Impossibility of Protecting Risk‐takers
证明，只要买家具有风险偏好（至少渐近风险偏好），卖家就能设计出获取无界利润的销售机制，即使禁止使用类似彩票的机制也无法保护买家。
Risk‐neutral sellers can extract high profits from risk‐loving buyers using lotteries. To limit risk‐taking, gambling is heavily regulated in most countries. In this article, I show that protecting risk‐loving buyers is essentially impossible. Even if sellers are restricted from using mechanisms that resemble lotteries, they can still construct selling mechanisms that ensure unbounded profits as long as buyers are risk‐loving, at least asymptotically. Asymptotically risk‐loving preferences are both sufficient and necessary for unbounded profits. Buyers are asymptotically risk‐loving, for example, when they are globally risk‐loving, when they have cumulative prospect theory preferences, or when their utility is bounded from below.