MULTIPERIOD MATCHING
研究了一个动态双边一对一匹配市场，定义了动态稳定匹配并给出存在条件，推广了延迟接受算法以处理跨期偏好互补，对市场设计如住院医师匹配有参考价值。
Abstract We examine a dynamic, two‐sided, one‐to‐one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.