Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*
通过实验室实验，研究竞争加剧如何影响企业隐藏附加产品的策略，发现双寡头市场更常隐藏信息，且隐藏行为有助于在基础产品价格上达成默契合谋。
Abstract We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.