Public–private mix of health expenditure: A political economy and quantitative analysis
构建了一个多数投票模型，研究异质性收入个体如何决定公共与私人卫生支出，并通过22个发达民主国家的数据量化了公共与私人卫生支出的相对有效性和替代性对公私混合的影响。
Abstract This paper constructs a simple model to examine decisions on public and private health spending under majority voting. In the model, agents with heterogeneous incomes choose how much to consume and spend on health care and vote for public health expenditure. The health status of an agent is determined by a CES composite of public and private health expenditure. The existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium are established. A quantitative exercise reveals the importance of the relative effectiveness of public and private health expenditure and their substitutability in determining the public‐private mix of health expenditure and in accounting for the observed differences across a sample of 22 advanced democratic countries.