Disclosure to a Psychological Audience
研究仁慈专家如何向有心理顾虑的代理人披露信息，提出计算最优信息策略的方法，并发现对诱惑敏感的代理人不应知道自己错过了什么，而厌恶信息的代理人只需被告知行动建议。
We study how a benevolent expert should disclose information to an agent with psychological concerns. We first provide a method to compute an optimal information policy for many psychological traits. The method suggests, for instance, that an agent suffering from temptation à la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) should not know what he is missing, thereby explaining observed biases as an optimal reaction to costly self-control. We also show that simply recommending actions is optimal when the agent is intrinsically averse to information but has instrumental uses for it. This result, which circumvents the failure of the Revelation Principle in psychological environments, simplifies disclosure and informs the debate regarding mandated disclosure.