Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?
分析了欧洲主权债务危机期间最后贷款人贷款的数据，发现资本不足的银行借入更多贷款并使用风险更高的抵押品，还利用这些贷款购买高风险资产，导致风险资产从资本充足的银行转移。
ABSTRACT We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.