Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices
研究一人一票议会选举中，选民既关心胜选者又关心议会构成时，选举门槛如何影响政党进入和胜选前景，发现门槛越高，孔多塞胜出者获胜可能性越低。
Abstract In this paper, we study one‐person–one‐vote parliamentary elections where voters care both about the winner of elections and about the composition of the parliament. Parties enter the parliament if and only if their vote share exceeds some predetermined threshold. We show that equilibria generically exist in which all parties obtain a non‐degenerate vote‐share and, perhaps more importantly, we show that the size of the electoral threshold acts as a coordination device, which crucially affects the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party. In particular, we argue that the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party decrease with the size of the entry threshold.