The myth of the Folk Theorem
证明，对于三人无限重复博弈，寻找纳什均衡在计算上极其困难，除非PPAD类问题能在随机多项式时间内解决，这挑战了民间定理认为重复博弈更容易找到均衡的观点。
A well-known result in game theory known as "the Folk Theorem" suggests that finding Nash equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in one-shot games. In contrast, we show that the problem of finding any (approximate) Nash equilibrium for a three-player infinitely-repeated game is computationally intractable (even when all payoffs are in {-1,0,1}), unless all of PPAD can be solved in randomized polynomial time. This is done by showing that finding Nash equilibria of (k+1)-player infinitely-repeated games is as hard as finding Nash equilibria of k-player one-shot games, for which PPAD-hardness is known (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2006; Chen, Deng and Teng, 2006; Chen, Teng and Valiant, 2007). This also explains why no computationally-efficient learning dynamics, such as the "no regret" algorithms, can be "rational" (in general games with three or more players) in the sense that, when one's opponents use such a strategy, it is not in general a best reply to follow suit.