Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy
通过分析近代早期意大利公共年金利率的新数据集，发现尽管债务增长且财政收入停滞，借贷成本却下降；封建制和教会干预推高了成本，而议会、战争和中央财政机构影响不大，对专制主义导致意大利经济衰退的观点提出质疑。
By analyzing a newly compiled data set of interest rates on public annuities in early modern Italy, this article finds that the cost of borrowing fell in spite of growing debts and stagnating fiscal revenues. Feudalism and clerical interference increased the cost of borrowing, while parliaments, wars, and centralized fiscal institutions mattered little. The constitutional representation of creditors may have meant significant markups for republican oligarchs. These results cast doubts on the claim that the growth of absolutism was at the root of Italy's economic decline.