MATCHING OWN PRICES, RIVALS' PRICES OR BOTH?*
研究零售商同时提供价格匹配保证和最惠顾客条款的现象，发现这两种策略单独使用会推高价格，而联合使用比单独任何一种更能导致更高价格。
Many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals and extend their promise to include their own future prices. That is, many retailers combine elements of both price‐matching guarantees and retroactive most‐favored‐customer clauses. This is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each practice independently has the potential to facilitate supracompetitive prices, and thus one might think the two practices are substitutes. In this paper, we show that price‐matching guarantees and most‐favored‐customer clauses complement each other when offered unilaterally by a single firm and can lead to higher prices than either one could have facilitated by itself.