Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?
研究了信息不对称对并购溢价的影响，将并购视为英式拍卖，发现更知情的竞标者（如目标公司的大股东）支付的溢价更低。
Abstract We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers