Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance
研究个人提前知晓未来失业对失业保险市场的影响，发现知晓后消费减少、配偶劳动供给增加，现有支付意愿低估保险价值，但私人信息导致的逆向选择使私人保险难以盈利。
This paper studies the implications of individuals’ knowledge of future job loss for the existence of an unemployment insurance (UI) market. Learning about job loss leads to consumption decreases and spousal labor supply increases. This suggests existing willingness to pay estimates for UI understate its value. But it yields new estimation methodologies that account for and exploit responses to learning about future job loss. Although the new willingness to pay estimates exceed previous estimates, I estimate much larger frictions imposed by private information. This suggests privately traded UI policies would be too adversely selected to be profitable, at any price.