Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?
研究了管理能力对银行流动性创造和风险承担行为的影响，发现高能力管理者创造更多流动性并承担更多风险，但在金融危机期间会减少流动性创造以去杠杆。
Abstract This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.