Relational contracts with subjective peer evaluations
研究了多工人企业中基于公开绩效信号和私下同伴评价的动态最优合约，发现评估与努力由不同工人执行时可达最优，而团队中努力激励与诚实报告激励不可分离，最优静态合约低效，关系合约可提升效率。
We study optimal dynamic contracting for a firm with multiple workers where compensation is based on public performance signals and privately reported peer evaluations. We show that if evaluation and effort provision are done by different workers (e.g., consider supervisor‐agent hierarchy), first‐best can be achieved even in a static setting. However, if each worker both exerts effort and reports peer evaluations (e.g., consider team setting), effort incentives cannot be decoupled from truth‐telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract inefficient. Relational contracts based on public signals increase efficiency. Interestingly, the optimal contract may ignore signals that are informative about effort.