Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences
研究了当参与者的偏好受对方行为影响时，稳定匹配问题如何变化，发现传统稳定匹配机制（如Gale-Shapley）的均衡结果可能不稳定，但稍加修改后能保证均衡匹配在自然互惠性下是稳定的。
We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g., the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result in matchings that are not stable with respect to the agents' endogenous preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is slightly modified, every equilibrium of its induced game results in a pairwise stable matching with respect to the endogenous preferences as long as they satisfy a natural reciprocity property.