Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector
构建美国银行业结构实证模型，发现未保险存款需求随银行财务困境下降，而保险存款不敏感；校准模型显示多重均衡和银行挤兑特征，资本要求低于18%会导致系统不稳定。
We develop a structural empirical model of the US banking sector. Insured depositors and run-prone uninsured depositors choose between differentiated banks. Banks compete for deposits and endogenously default. The estimated demand for uninsured deposits declines with banks' financial distress, which is not the case for insured deposits. We calibrate the supply side of the model. The calibrated model possesses multiple equilibria with bank-run features, suggesting that banks can be very fragile. We use our model to analyze proposed bank regulations. For example, our results suggest that a capital requirement below 18 percent can lead to significant instability in the banking system.