Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms
研究了2003-2012年法国上市家族企业中多个大股东的存在、数量和投票权如何影响企业风险承担，发现多个大股东能抑制家族所有者低风险投资的倾向，且在公司治理冲突更严重时效果更强。
We investigate the role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in corporate risk-taking. Using a sample of publicly listed French family firms over the period 2003−2012, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS are associated with higher risk-taking. Our results suggest that MLS help restrain the propensity of family owners to undertake low-risk investments. This effect is much stronger in firms that are more susceptible to agency conflicts. The results highlight the important governance role played by MLS in family firms and may explain why MLS are associated with higher firm performance.