Hospital systems and bargaining power: evidence from out‐of‐market acquisitions
研究美国2000-2010年跨市场医院收购对议价价格的影响，发现被收购医院价格比独立医院高约17%，附近竞争对手价格也上涨约8%，表明跨市场并购削弱了竞争。
Analyses of hospital mergers typically focus on acquisitions that alter local market concentration. However, as prices are negotiated between hospital systems and insurers, this focus may overlook the impact of cross‐market interdependence in the bargaining outcome. Using data on out‐of‐market acquisitions occurring across the United States from 2000–2010, we investigate the impact of cross‐market dependencies on negotiated prices. We find that prices at hospitals acquired by out‐of‐market systems increase by about 17% more than unacquired, stand‐alone hospitals and confirm that out‐of‐market mergers result in a relaxation of competition, the prices of nearby competitors to acquired hospitals increase by around 8%.