What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions
利用风险模型分析美国各州放松银行分支机构限制的时机，发现利益集团因素（如大银行与小企业的支持、小银行与保险公司的反对）能解释放松管制的进程和国会投票，其中私人利益理论解释力最强。
This paper investigates private-interest, public-interest, and political-institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state-level deregulation of bank branching restrictions. Using a hazard model, we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small, bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century. The same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation. While we find some support for each theory, the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results.