Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons
研究了买卖双方交易可分割商品时的讨价还价，卖方私下知道商品质量高低，买方随时间出价，发现可分割性导致买方自我竞争，最终高质量商品被平滑交易而买方收益趋零。
We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a divisible good. The seller is privately informed about its quality, which can be high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in quantity. The buyer makes offers over time. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer’s present and future selves. The buyer’s temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer’s payoff shrinks to zero.